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THE SECONDARY MARKET FOR LIFE INSURANCE
POLICIES: UNCOVERING LIFE INSURANCE'S
"HIDDEN" VALUE*
Neil A. Doherty"
Brian A. O'Dea'"
Hal J. Singer-"
In this article, we examine the benefits that an active secondary
market for life insurance policies provides to the policyholder. We
begin by briefly explaining the development of the secondary market for
life insurance and the economic consequences of that development.
Most notably, although insurance carriers typically offer reasonably
competitive surrender values for policies, those carriers were
monopsony repurchasers of life insurance policies before the advent of
the secondary market. As a result, individuals with impaired health
were unable to receive appropriate compensation before the
development of viatical and life settlement firms. Viatical and life
settlement firms erode this monopsony power and generate positive
consumer welfare gains. Next, we evaluate the benefits and risks to
individual policyholders associated with secondary market transactions
and estimate the aggregate benefit of the secondary market to
policyholders. The current consumer benefit from the secondary
market is less than it could be because policyholders in many cases are
not aware the market even exists. Indeed, the magnitude of the benefits
is positively correlatedto the quantity of coverage sold to life settlement
firms and to the improvement in the terms of accelerated death benefits
offered by incumbent carriers. Finally, we describe the evolving
regulatory environment in which the secondary marketfunctions.

* Two of the authors published a similar article in Neil A. Doherty & Hal J. Singer,
The Benefits of a Secondary Market for Life Insurance Policies, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 449 (2003).
- Ronald A. Rosenfeld Professor of Insurance and Risk Management, The Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania.
- Senior Consultant, Criterion Economics, L.L.C.
- Senior Vice President, Criterion Economics, L.L.C.
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I. INTRODUCTION

It is common to think of a life insurance policy as a risk
management tool that generates value upon the death of the
policyholder.
A life insurance policy, however, is also a
financial asset. As a financial asset, a life insurance policy can
have a positive actuarial value-often a substantial positive
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value-while the policyholder is still living.' The shorter the
remaining life expectancy of an individual, the closer the
actuarial value of his policy will be to the face value of the
insurance coverage. Thus, as an individual grows older, his
insurance policy becomes a more and more valuable asset.
Though valuable, a life insurance policy was a relatively
illiquid asset until recently, due in large part to the monopsony
position of life insurance carriers over the repurchase of life
insurance policies that they had issued. 2 Whereas a car owner
has always been able to sell a car that no longer fits his needs to
a variety of different buyers, a life insurance policyholder has
traditionally had few choices; either allow the policy to lapse or
sell the policy back to the issuing carrier for its surrender value.'
Surrender values are set ex ante in the primary market for
life insurance, which is characterized by a moderately high
degree of competition. The surrender price, however, is based
on an assumption of normal health. Because of the issuing
insurance carriers' monopsony positions in the secondary
market, individuals who experienced negative shifts in life
expectancy could only liquidate their life insurance policies at
very unfavorable terms.4 Many consumers with impaired health
were economically compelled to surrender their policies, and life
insurance carriers earned economic rents from these surrenders.,
The emergence of viatical and life settlement firms allows
1. The actuarial value of a policy is the face value of a policy's death benefit
discounted for the remaining life expectancy of the individual covered by the policy.
2. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL

ORGANIZATION 105-07 (Addison-Wesley 3d ed. 2000) (explaining that the term
"monopsony" refers to a firm that is the only purchaser of goods or services in a given
market, just as the term "monopoly" refers to a firm that is the only producer of goods or
services in a given market).
3. A few policyholders did sell their policies to individual speculators. Such sales,
however, provided the speculator with a financial interest in the early demise of the
policyholder. As there were no safeguards against those interests, individual policy sales
tended to be an option only for those in dire financial need.
4. When a policyholder experiences a negative shift to his or her life expectancy, the
present value of the death benefit increases, because the payment of benefits will occur
sooner than originally projected. At the same time, the present value of the premium
payments decreases, because those payments will not continue for as long as originally
projected. Both effects cause an increase in the actuarial value of a policy for an individual
with a shortened lifespan.
5. The terms "normal" and "impaired" are used throughout this paper to refer to an
individual's state of health (and the corresponding state of that individual's life insurance
policy). "Normal" health refers to the state of an individual's health that is normal relative
to that individual's health at issuance. Similarly, the term "impaired" health refers to a state
of health that is impaired relative to the state of health at issuance.
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policyholders who have experienced a negative shift in life
expectancy to obtain the fair market value for their life insurance
assets. Although it does not make sense for most policyholders
to surrender their policies at the market value, 6 the flexibility
offered by the secondary market for life insurance policies gives
a policyholder the ability to respond to changes in her life
situation. There are a multitude of circumstances under which a
viatical or life settlement may be welfare enhancing, such as
when a policyholder can no longer afford to pay the premiums
on the policy, when a policyholder requires funds to pay for
medical expenses, when the policyholder no longer needs the
policy, or when the liquidation of the policy would further the
estate planning or charitable goals of the policyholder.
Viatical and life settlements represent one of several life
insurance innovations through which companies that develop
innovative actuarial analyses have been able to glean profits due
to their superior ability to assess mortality and other risks. In
this sense, life settlements are essentially similar to innovations
introduced in prior generations, such as the differentiation
between smokers and nonsmokers that began in the 1980s.
However, unlike most prior innovations in the insurance
industry, which sought to "skim" the healthiest (that is, the least
risky) patients from the pool, life settlements actually benefit
those who have become greater-than-average risks.7 Moreover,
because the existence of a secondary market for life insurance
has improved the liquidity of all life insurance policies that
might potentially qualify for settlement, the secondary market
makes policies in the primary market more valuable for all
consumers, regardless of their current state of health.
In Section II, we review the purpose of life insurance and
provide an overview of the secondary market for life insurance.
We begin by discussing how incumbent carriers exercised
monopsony power in the secondary market for life insurance
policies. We then describe how the advent of viatical and life
settlement firms has eliminated the incumbent life insurance
6. Lynn Asinof, Your Pocketbook: Selling Off Life Insurance: Good Policy?, WALL

ST. J., May 15, 2002, at D2 (quoting Alan Buerger, cofounder and CEO of Coventry First,
L.L.C., a leading life settlement firm) ("People shouldn't be selling their policy if they have
the means to keep it.. . . But the reality is that people drop insurance every day.").
7. Substandard life annuities, which have enjoyed significant growth since their
inception, are another innovation in the insurance industry aimed at serving the needs of
individuals with impaired health.
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carriers' position as the sole purchaser of their own policies in
the secondary market and provided policyholders the
opportunity to exercise their assignability rights at competitive
rates. This has increased the number of policies sold.
In Section III, we examine the benefits and risks that viatical
and life settlement transactions pose to individual consumers.
Viatical and life settlement firms benefit individuals living with
diminished life expectancies by allowing them to harness the
value of their life insurance policies for a variety of purposes
while they are still alive. Indeed, the ability to sell a life
insurance policy in a competitive secondary market can provide
a policyholder with the ability to receive more money when it is
needed the most-that is, when a decline in health makes it
impractical or undesirable for him to continue to make the
necessary premium payments to keep the policy in force.
Although there are certain risks associated with viatical and life
settlements, the risks to the individual policyholder are minimal,
and we explain how they can be avoided. We demonstrate that
life settlements, alone, generate aggregate surplus benefits in
excess of $240 million annually for policyholders who exercise
their option to sell their policies at a competitive rate. The total
annual consumer benefit from the competitive secondary market
for life insurance likely vastly exceeds this number.
In Section IV, we explain that the welfare gains associated
with the secondary market for life insurance are not as great as
they could be, as the lack of information about the secondary
market for life insurance prompts policyholders to make
inefficient decisions regarding their life insurance holdings. We
examine the effects of such suboptimal decisions and explain
some of the barriers to greater consumer knowledge about the
secondary market.
Finally, in Section V, we briefly discuss the regulatory
environment under which viatical and life settlement firms
operate.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET FOR LIFE INSURANCE

The traditional function of insurance is to protect a policyholder
from absorbing the full impact of some potential future loss.
Technically, optimal life insurance equalizes the marginal utility
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of money across all states of nature." That is to say, a
policyholder who is optimally insured will value one additional
dollar exactly the same whether the insured event occurs or not.9
The idea of insurance is not to equate wealth or total utility
in all situations. For example, an annuity is designed to give the
consumer a fixed amount of money each year and, thus, a
relatively constant marginal utility of money. An annuity
actually increases the expected variance in a consumer's total
utility. Consider two identically situated individuals who
purchase identical annuities: one dies shortly after buying an
annuity, and the other lives longer than expected.
The
individual who dies early comes out behind in terms of both
total wealth and total utility as a result of the annuity purchase,
whereas the individual who lives longer comes out ahead in
both categories.
During the time period in which both
individuals are alive, however, their marginal utility of money is
the same. The annuity makes sense because it protects against
the "risk" of longevity. The individual who lives longer has
more use for money. Without an annuity, that individual would
face ever-decreasing savings and an ever-increasing marginal
utility of money.
The motivation for the purchase of life insurance is exactly
the opposite. A consumer will purchase life insurance if his
marginal utility of bequests in the short term is greater than his
marginal utility of money in the long term. This high short-term
marginal utility can be the product of a number of factors, but
the most common is the desire to provide for a family or other
dependents in the case of premature death. Insurance is also a
tool for the management of risk. Life insurance protects against
the risk of financial hardship for an individual's dependents in
the case of that individual's death.
The right of assignability allows a consumer to transfer a
policy to another beneficiary. Sometimes this right is used to
assign benefits to different family members, but the right also
enables the policyholder to name a third party as the beneficiary.
8. This definition assumes that a policy is priced in an actuarially fair manner and that
no systematic risk affects a customer's marginal utility of money.
9. Moral hazard may prevent full equalization. For example, if fire insurance makes a
building owner indifferent to a fire, he will not take efficient protection measures. There is
less moral hazard with life insurance, but arguably a breadwinner might take on more risks
if his family is protected by insurance. If behavior is observable then there is no problem
because premiums can be conditioned on behavior to induce efficiency.
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This right is valuable because if a policyholder's preferences
shift at some point such that his marginal utility of money
exceeds his marginal utility of bequests, the policy may well
become worth more to a third party, such as a life settlement
firm, than it is to the original policyholder. 0
Before the entry of viatical and life settlement firms,
however, the life insurance carrier could exercise monopsony
power in the secondary market for its own policies. Although
competition in the primary market prevented the incumbent
from exercising this power in the repurchase of normal policies that is, policies for which the insured is of normal health,
primary market competition did not eliminate this monopsony
power for impaired policies. As a result, life insurance carriers
have historically earned economic rents on the surrender of
those policies.
A.

THE PURCHASE OF IMPAIRED POLICIES BY INCUMBENT
CARRIERS

Surrender values and conditions under which policies can
be surrendered are usually specified in the insurance contract
and, thus, determined in the primary market for life insurance.
Surrender values are set to roughly correspond to the surplus
value that builds up in policies over time, based on the
assumption that the health of the policyholder unfolds on a
normal path."
The existence of a surrender value for a policy does not
obligate an individual who wishes to resell his policy to resell to
the issuing insurance carrier. Indeed, life insurance policies are
typically assignable, which means that a policyholder is free to
transfer his ownership of the policy to another person. A
policyholder's right to assign his policy to someone other than
10. Although we focus on the case of reduced life expectancy in this article, the reason
that a transfer is valuable is not essential to our analysis. For example, a guaranteed
insurance contract that provided an 8% return would be worth more than the immediate
value in today's market of a 4% return. A healthy person who lost his job and needed
money would benefit from being able to sell such a policy rather than just cashing it in.
Nonetheless, in most cases, an individual's health must be impaired in order to sell a policy
for more than its cash surrender value. See Jane Bryant Quinn, Staying Ahead: "Life
Settlements" Not Easy Money for Seller or Buyer, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, May 15, 2001, at
3D.
11. There is no buildup in value for some term life policies, because the schedule of
premiums is set to cover the projected mortality risk associated with a policyholder over the
life of the policy. The surrender value for those policies is, thus, zero.
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the insurance carrier has existed for some time, which means
that there potentially has been a secondary market for life
insurance policies for as long as policies have been assignable.
In its early stages, this market consisted of only the issuing life
insurance carrier and a handful of individual speculators at the

margins.12
Figure 1 shows how the surplus payments of a whole life
policyholder create economic value in the policy over time and
how the surrender value tracks this increased value.13 In this
case, the policyholder buys the policy at age forty. The buildup
of policy value assumes that the policyholder's health follows a
normal pattern as he ages. The vertical distance between the
two curves is the economic margin earned by the life insurance
carrier on the surrender of a healthy policy, together with an
allowance for transaction costs.
FIGURE 1: ECONOMIC VALUES AND SURRENDER VALUE
Value of
Policy
Face

Value
Policy Value for
65 yr old in very
poor health

Economic Value
based on Normal

I

Health

Surrender Value
based on Normal
Health

Age
40 yrs

65 yrs

12. It was possible for policyholders to use their life insurance policies as collateral for
loans from certain financial institutions. However, because the policyholder retained
ownership under such a transaction, it was not technically a secondary market transaction.
13. We have in mind a whole life policy, but the same mechanism can be applied to
term life with flat premiums. Also, note that the curve of surrender value lies below the
curve of the economic value of a healthy policy because of the load factor and the fact that
the primary market was not perfectly competitive.
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Now consider a policyholder whose health suddenly
deteriorates significantly at age sixty-five.
Because the
policyholder's life expectancy is curtailed, the present actuarial
value of the policy will be much higher than for a sixty-fiveyear-old in normal health. Figure 1 demonstrates that if the
issuing insurance company creates a single schedule of
surrender values based on a uniform assumption of normal
health, the company's surrender terms will be low relative to the
actual policy value for an individual with impaired health. The
incumbent will still earn supracompetitive rents on the
surrender of impaired policies. The incumbent carrier can use
those rents to cover the losses it experiences from the surrender
of policies by individuals with above-normal health or to
improve its competitive position in the primary market by
subsidizing premiums. The incumbent carrier may also retain a
portion of these rents as profits.
A policyholder with impaired health cannot bargain
effectively for a more generous surrender offer ex post because
the issuing carrier is the monopsony repurchaser of the policy.
The policyholder would be forced to either accept an amount
that is substantially less than the true economic value or elect
not to surrender the policy. This uniform pricing creates a
deadweight social loss. Individuals who desire to sell their
policies for a higher price than the healthy rate are unable to do
so, even if they are willing to accept a price that is less than the
competitive market rate. Thus, many individuals will continue
to hold policies even though it would be mutually advantageous
for both them and the insurance company if the insurance
company were to repurchase their policies at a price exceeding
the set surrender value of those policies.
If there were a competitive secondary market in which these
policies could be resold, however, the surrender value for
impaired policies would rise to its competitive level, and a
greater number of policyholders would sell their policies.14 A
competitive secondary market would, therefore, eliminate both
the monopsonist's rent and the associated efficiency loss.
B.

SECONDARY MARKET ENTRY BY VIATICAL AND LIFE

14. This follows from the economic principle that a monopolist loses its price-setting
ability with the entry of competition. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER,
ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 272 (Dryden Press 6th ed. 1994).
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SETTLEMENT FIRMS

The creation of a competitive secondary market or the
enhancement of an existing secondary market improves the
value of the underlying good to consumers by making it a more
liquid asset.'5 The emergence of viatical and life settlement firms
has led to an increase in the liquidity of life insurance policies
and a mitigation of much of the downside risk from the
purchase of a life insurance policy in the primary market. An
informed consumer now knows that if he should experience a
decline in life expectancy and no longer need (or no longer be
able to afford) his life insurance policy, he will be able to sell it
for its market value instead of having to surrender it for the set
price offered by the insurance carrier.
Entry of viatical and life settlement firms has introduced
competition into the secondary market for life insurance and
thereby reduced the monopsony power of incumbent life
insurance carriers in that market.
Viatical firms, which
specialize in the purchase of life insurance policies from
terminally ill policyholders, emerged in the late 1980s in
response to the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
epidemic, as many individuals abruptly found themselves in
need of money to pay for medical treatment and maintain their
standard of living. These individuals sought liquidity from their
long-term assets, including life insurance policies.
The
shortened life horizons of those living with AIDS meant that the
actuarial values of their policies-that is, the risk-adjusted value
of the death benefit when taking into account future costs-had
come to significantly exceed the policies' surrender values.16
Investors were willing to purchase those policies for
substantially more than the prearranged termination terms
offered by the insurance companies, and viatical firms emerged
to facilitate the sales of impaired polices to these investors. The
United States Congress, recognizing the value of these
15. See Neil A. Doherty & Hal J. Singer, The Benefits of a Secondary Market for Life

Insurance Policies, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 449 (2003) (describing the benefits of
the secondary markets to asset holders in the home mortgage and catastrophic risk insurance
industry and compares that with the benefits to life insurance policyholders).
16. When a policy becomes impaired, the present value of the death benefit increases
because death will occur sooner than originally projected. At the same time, the present
value of premium payments decreases, because they will not continue for as long as
originally projected. Both effects cause an increase in the actuarial value of a policy for an
individual with a shortened lifespan.
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transactions, changed the taxation of sales by policyholders with
life expectancies of less than two years so that they would no
longer pay a tax penalty relative to those who held their policies
to maturity. 7
The viatical industry has grown rapidly since the early
1990s.
According to the Viatical Association of America,
between $1.8 billion and $4 billion of policies were viaticated in
2001,18 up from $50 million in 1990 and $1 billion as recently as
1999.19

Around the year 2000, another type of firm entered the
secondary market for life insurance-the life settlement firm.
Whereas viatical firms typically only purchase policies from
policyholders with life expectancies of less than two years, life
settlement firms purchase policies from individuals who are
over the age of sixty-five, have experienced a decline in health,
and have remaining life expectancies of between six and twelve
years (although in some cases life expectancies outside this
range are considered).2 0
Life settlement firms use more
sophisticated underwriting models than viatical firms and do
not purchase policies from individuals who are terminally ill.21
Furthermore, life settlement firms prefer policies with face
values of $500,000 or greater and policies for which the cash
value is no more than 40% of the death benefit. 2
More than 20% of policyholders over the age of sixty-five
are estimated to hold policies whose economic values exceed
their cash surrender values. 23 Conning and Company, an
17. FED. TRADE COMM'N, VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS: A GUIDE FOR PEOPLE WITH
TERMINAL ILLNESS (May 1998).
18. Erich W. Sippel & Alan H. Buerger, A Free Market for Life Insurance,

CONTINGENCIES, Mar./Apr. 2002, at 17, 18 (citing studies by Erich Sippel & Co. and the
Viatical Ass'n of America).
19. Carrie Coolidge, Death Wish Investors in Insurance Policiesfor the Terminally Ill
are Watching Their Capital Get Annihilated, FORBES, Mar. 19, 2001, at 206.
20. Asinof, supra note 6; Associated Press, Seniors Should Exercise Caution When
ConsideringLife Settlements (Feb. 8, 2001) (citing Michael Snowdon, Academic Associate
at the College for Financial Planning). See Retirement Protection: Fighting Fraud in the
Sale of Death: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Fin. Servs., Oversight and
Investigations Subcomm., 107th Cong. 65, 66 (2002) (written statement of David M. Lewis,
President of the Life Settlement Institute) [hereinafter Retirement Protection].
21. See Retirement Protectionsupra note 20.
22. See Juan Hovey, Selling Your Life Insurance Policy Can Help Ensure Business
Liquidity, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2001, at C3 (citing Michael Cavalier Sr., President and CEO
of Cavalier Associates Insurance Services).
23. Alan H. Buerger, Life Settlements Come ofAge, TRUSTS & ESTATES, Nov. 2002 at
34, available at http://www.coventryfirst.com/information/files/TEll2002.pdf (last visited
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insurance industry researcher, concluded that the total value of
life insurance policies held by senior citizens is $492 billion,
which means that the potential market for life settlements is
close to $100 billion.24
Entry of viatical and life settlement firms will eliminate the
economic rent that incumbent carriers have previously earned
on the repurchase of impaired policies firms, increase their costs,
and place upward pressure on insurance premiums. Those
increased premiums, however, will simply match a quality
enhancement in policies themselves due to their increased
liquidity, as we will examine further in the following section.
Furthermore, only a portion of incumbent carriers' cost increases
will be passed on to consumers.2 5
C. THE COMPETITIVE RESPONSE OF INCUMBENT CARRIERS:
ACCELERATED DEATH BENEFITS
Before the entry by viatical and life settlement firms, the
only buyer in the secondary market for a given life insurance
policy was the insurance company that issued the policy. In the
early 1990s, after the entry of competitors, life insurance
companies developed accelerated death benefits (ADBs), which
gave policyholders the option of receiving between 25% to
nearly 100% of their death benefit while they were living. 26 To
qualify for an ADB, a policyholder must have a death benefit
rider on her policy (although in many cases it is not difficult to
add such a rider once it is needed) and, depending on the policy,
must either have a dramatically reduced life expectancy, suffer
from one of a number of specified medical conditions-often
called "dread diseases"-or require long-term care.2 7 Although
Oct. 28, 2004).
24. Teresa Dixon Murray, Viaticals Carry Risk of Fraud, State Warns Betting On
Death Unwise, Experts Say, PLAIN DEALER REP., Mar. 31, 2002, at G 1.
25. The degree to which any cost increase is passed on to consumers is dependent on
the elasticity of demand for life insurance in the primary market-the more elastic the
demand, the less of the cost increase the incumbent insurers will be able to impose on
consumers. This is the same principle that applies to tax burden analysis. See BAUMOL &
BLINDER, supra note 14, at 241-42.

EDGAR K. BROWNING & WILLIAM R. JOHNSON, THE

DISTRIBUTION OF THE TAx BURDEN, 1979 Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research.
26. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 17.
27. LIFE INSURANCE MARKET RESEARCH ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL (LIMRA)
INTERNATIONAL & AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, ACCELERATED DEATH
BENEFITS: 1998, 4 (1999) [hereinafter LIMRA INTERNATIONAL STUDY].
See also
Accelerated Death Benefits Provisos on Rise, INS. ACCT., Apr. 19, 1999, at 1 [hereinafter
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the life expectancy required for the exercise of an ADB varies by
company, product, and state; twelve months is the most
common maximum allowed life expectancy: only between 2%
and 5% of the ADBs on the market triggered by terminal illness
allow a policyholder with a life expectancy of greater than one
year to accelerate his death benefit. 28
Accelerated Death Benefits were developed as a competitive
reaction to the emergence of viatical firms. 29 The number of
policies with ADB riders has grown in line with the growth of
the viatical and life settlement industry, as life insurance carriers
added them to policies with increasing regularity during the
mid and late 1990s. According to Life Insurance Market
Research Association International (LIMRA), approximately 39.9
million life insurance policies contained ADB provisions in 1998,
which was more than double the number of ADB policies in
1994.0
Accelerated Death Benefits have also become cheaper and
more easily available over the last decade. In 1990, nearly 90%
of ADBs required additional premium payments or cost of
insurance.3 ' By 1998, however, only 13% of policies with a death
benefit rider involved a higher premium or an otherwise
increased cost of insurance, 32 and over half of ADB features
available on individual policies were automatically offered to
eligible policyholders by insurance companies.33
Analyses of the life insurance industry indicate that viatical
settlements and ADBs are close substitutes. 4 ADBs are not close
ADB Provisos].

28. LIMRA INTERNATIONAL STUDY, supra note 27, at 7 (reporting that a full 73% of
the ADBs examined in the LIMRA study required a life expectancy of one year or less, and
another 21% required a life expectancy of six months or less). See Am. Family Life
Assurance Co., How to Read Your Policy, at http://www.aflac.con/policyservices/
understandpolicyread.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
29. Chuck Jones, Living Benefits More Popular Add-On, 95 ADVISOR TODAY 36
(2000) (stating that the accelerated death benefit was "conceived more than a decade ago
largely in response to the creation of viatical settlements").
30. LIMRA INTERNATIONAL STUDY, supra note 27, at 19. At least 245 life
companies, which held 78% of the life insurance in force in the United States, offered
policies with some form of ADBs in 1998. ADB Provisos, supra note 27, at 1.
31. LIMRA INTERNATIONAL STUDY, supra note 27, at 10.
32. Id. at 10 (stating that of policies with a death benefit rider, 36% charge nothing,
except in some cases, an administrative fee, and 46% charge policyholders only if the rider
is exercised).
33. LIMRA, supra note 27, at 8.
34. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 17; Carolyn T. Geer, 1996 Cashing in Your
Chips (Selling Life Insurance Policies for Cash), FORBES, June 17, 1996, at 208.
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substitutes for life settlements, because the eligible life
expectancies for the two products do not overlap. By 2001,
however, incumbent carriers began to compete more effectively
with life settlement firms by lobbying for expanded definitions
of "qualifying events" that trigger ADBs. If an incumbent
carrier is permitted to offer an ADB for chronic illness, in
addition to terminal illness, that carrier can provide a closer
substitute to life settlement firms. In September 2002, the New
Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance (The Department)
proposed an amendment to expand the circumstances under
which an ADB could be exercised to include chronic illness. The
Department determined that such an expansion "should
positively affect consumers" and further predicted that
"[i]nsurers should benefit since policyholders now have more
flexibility in accelerating a portion of their life insurance rather
than exercising other life settlement options.""
III. THE BENEFITS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET FOR LIFE
INSURANCE

The emergence of viatical and life settlement firms has generated
an increase in the liquidity of life insurance policies. The
secondary market for life insurance mitigates the downside risk
from the original purchase of a policy in the primary market.
An informed consumer now knows that if he should experience
a decline in life expectancy and no longer need (or no longer be
able to afford) his life insurance policy, he will be able to sell it
for its market value instead of having to surrender it for the
supracompetitive price offered by the insurance carrier. Indeed,
if a policyholder's health declines, the value of his life insurance
policy actually appreciates. This mitigation of downside risk
makes life insurance a more attractive asset and should,
therefore, be expected to cause consumers in the primary market
for life insurance to demand a greater quantity of coverage.
Although life insurance is primarily a tool for the management
of mortality risk, as we explained in the previous section, the
development of a competitive secondary market endowed life
insurance with the additional function of hedging against
serious health impairments.
35. N.J. Admin. Code § 11:4-30.3, proposed amendment (2002), available at
www.state.nj.us/dobi/acrobat/pnO2 324.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
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In this section, we perform a theoretical analysis of the
welfare gains that are obtained by the emergence of competitive
firms in the secondary market for life insurance and examine
statistical evidence to develop a conservative estimate of the
consumer welfare gains from life settlements.
A. SPECIFIC BENEFITS OF SECONDARY MARKET TRANSACTIONS
TO INDIVIDUAL POLICYHOLDERS

Life insurance is a valuable asset and it is generally a good
investment.
Although it does not make sense for most
policyholders to surrender their policies at the market value, 36
the sale of a policy to a viatical or life settlement firm is often the
best option for an individual policyholder who has a high
current need for income. We turn now to an examination of the
specific situations in which the secondary market sale of a policy
by an eligible individual may be welfare improving:
* The policyholder can no longer afford to pay the
premiums on the policy, and it is not feasible for him
to keep the policy in force by using any program offered
by the insurance carrier (such as borrowing the
premium against the death benefit of the policy).
* The beneficiary for whom the policy was originally
purchased is now deceased or no longer has a need for
the policy.
* A key-man policy, designed to protect a company
from the financial loss of a key executive, is no longer
necessary, either because the business has folded or the
individual is no longer integral to the business's
success.
* The policyholder owns multiple life insurance policies
and wishes to eliminate one.
* The policyholder wishes to replace an individual
policy with a survivorship policy, with a long-term
care insurance policy, or with funds for long-term
36. Asinof, supra note 6.
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care.
* The policyholder requires funds to pay for medical
expenses or for new and experimental treatments for
herself or someone close to her.
* The sale of the policy would allow the policyholder to
maintain a desired standard of living and live out his
final years with dignity.
* The policyholder wishes to remove the policy from a
trust or estate.
* A reduction in the value of the policyholder's estate
reduces the tax liability for which the life insurance
policy was designed to provide.
* An increase in the liquidity of the policyholder's
estate eliminates the need for the policy.
* The policyholder wishes to donate highly appreciated
assets to charity but would be faced with liquidity
constraints resulting from such a donation.37
The examples listed above detail the many situations in
which a policyholder might wish to sell her life insurance policy.
Although it has always been possible for a policyholder to sell
his policy to the incumbent life insurance company, the
secondary market for life insurance policies gives the
policyholder the economic freedom to choose between a number
of buyers and, in so doing, to receive the fair market price for his
policy." In many cases, the difference between selling a life
insurance policy and the "second-best" option is striking. For
37. See Kaja Whitehouse, Getting Personal: Viaticals Mature, But Risks Remain, Dow

JONES NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 14, 2002, at 15:12:00 (citing Martin Nissenbaum, Nat'1 Director
of Retirement Planning at Ernst & Young, L.L.P.).
38. See Erich W. Sippel & Alan H. Buerger, Viatical Response, CONTINGENCIES,
July/Aug. 2002, at 6, 6 ("At bottom, the case for the secondary market in life insurance
policies is pro-freedom and pro-consumer. The existence of the secondary market
eliminates the disadvantageous situation in which policyholders have traditionally found
themselves in disposing of an unneeded life policy: being able to sell to only one buyer (the
company that issued the policy) at a price set by the buyer. That restriction on freedom
doesn't apply to the sale of any other asset.").
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example, companies are now using life settlements on key-man
policies to improve liquidity and respond to short-term cash
flow challenges without cutting jobs or employee benefits. 39
On an ex ante basis, the ability of a policyholder to sell an
impaired policy for its market value makes life insurance an
effective tool to protect against the financial risk of terminal
illness or general poor health. Thus, although life insurance is
primarily a hedge against mortality risk, assignable policies
provide consumers with the added value of a hedge against
serious health impairments. 40
B. SPECIFIC RISKS OF SECONDARY MARKET TRANSACTIONS TO
INDIVIDUAL POLICYHOLDERS

The following are the three most commonly mentioned
risks to individual policyholders from participation in a
secondary market transaction: (1) the company that purchases
the policy fails to pay the policyholder; (2) the policyholder is
persuaded to sell a policy even though such a sale is not in the
policyholder's best interest; and (3) the policyholder becomes
"worth more dead than alive" after selling his policy and
ostensibly is, thus, at a heightened risk to be the victim of foul
play.4 ' The first two risks are not specific to the secondary
market for life insurance. Indeed, they apply to almost any
contractual arrangement where one party makes payment to
another. The third risk, though sensational, is not a valid
concern in the modem secondary market. Indeed, many of the
top life settlement firms now aggregate policies into diversified
pools, a procedure that prevents investors from knowing the
individual identities of the individuals whose policies they now
hold. 42
To be certain, there have been abuses in the secondary
market for life insurance. Those abuses, however, have tended
39. Jolene D. Fullerton, Life Settlements: A New Way to Free Up Cash, 24 AFP

EXCHANGE 58 (Mar. 1,2004).
40. Whole life and universal life policies also have some tax deferral benefits and have
use in estate planning. Indeed, there is concern in the industry that the Bush savings plan
proposals will sharply reduce the tax incentives for using life insurance instead of other
savings vehicles.
41. See Creativity - A Blessing and a Curse, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTHFIN. SERVS. EDITION, Oct. 23, 2003 (providing an example of the "worth more dead than
alive" objection to secondary market transactions).
42. Asinoff, supra note 6.
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overwhelmingly to involve the fraudulent sale of interests in
viaticated policies to individual investors or the fraudulent
acquisition of new policies for resale to unscrupulous, or
unsophisticated, firms in the secondary market. 43 In contrast,
there have been relatively few instances in which policyholders
have been the targets of fraudulent practices. Indeed, in a March
2002 letter to the House Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations,
National
Association
of
Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC), President, Terri Vaughan, explained
that "[i]n reality, most settlement frauds now involve the
investor side of the transaction, not the insurance policyholder
side.""4 Nonetheless, policyholders can protect themselves by
checking with their state insurance regulator and dealing only
with established firms in the viatical and life settlement
industry.
There is a strong trend in the industry towards more
sophisticated and larger investors, which should diminish the
opportunities for investor fraud. As Terri Vaughan explains,
"[v]iatical settlements today are typically pooled together for
sale in larger amounts to more sophisticated investors." 4 5 In
October 2001, Warren Buffet's Berkshire Hathaway arranged to
invest up to $400 million in Living Benefits Financial Services,
L.L.C. 46 In a more recent example, on April 30, 2004, Merrill
Lynch arranged a private placement of $70 million in bonds by
Legacy Benefits Corporation backed by the company's life

43. Joseph Gerth, Kentucky Pulls Viatical Company's License, COURIER J., July 25,

2002, at 6C (stating that although there are not reliable estimates of the extent of the second
type of fraud, allegations that some viatical brokers were encouraging individuals with
terminal illnesses to fraudulently obtain insurance policies led to a federal investigation in
2000); Michelle Singletary, The Color of Money: A Foolish (And Ghoulish) Investment,

WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2002, at H I (providing a description of the first and most common
type of fraud, "Securities regulators from 21 states have reported that thousands of investors,
many of them elderly, have been defrauded of more than $400 million over the past three
years, according to the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA).
In one case in Texas, a viatical settlement company sold investors shares in nonexistent
insurance policies.").
44. Hearing Before the House Comm. on Fin. Serys., Oversight and Investigations

Subcomm., 107th Cong., Mar. 27, 2002 (letter from Terri Vaughan, president, NAIC, to Sue
Kelly and Luis V. Gutierrez, chair and ranking member (respectively), criticizing the

Committee's staff report for its misuse of NAIC data to wrongfully imply that policyholders
are the chief target of fraud in the secondary market for life insurance policies).
45. Id.
46. John Hoogesteger, Berkshire Unit Lends $400M to Startup, THE BUS. J.

(Minneapolis/St. Paul), Feb. 1, 2002, at 1, http://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/stories/
2002/02/04/storyl.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
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insurance policies.47 The due diligence performed by such
investors will have a policing effect on the industry, as firms
must either meet the necessary investment criteria of
institutional investors or fail to acquire such capital.
The greatest risk to an individual policyholder, therefore, is
that he does not completely understand his financial situation or
misjudges his need (or lack thereof) for a particular policy and
participates in a viatical settlement, life settlement, or ADB
based on incomplete knowledge of what he is doing. This risk is
one that can be prevented through consultation with the
policyholder's insurance agent or financial planner and
illustrates how important it is that insurance agents and
financial planners possess up-to-date knowledge of the
secondary market.
C. AGGREGATE BENEFITS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET TO
POLICYHOLDERS
As in any market, the quantity of insurance sold in the
primary market is determined by the price. Higher prices
induce more supply and less demand, and lower prices enhance
demand but depress supply. The market reaches equilibrium at
the price that equates supply with demand. For insurance, the
"price" is a little subtle and needs some explanation.
The premiums paid by a policyholder for a life insurance
policy with a particular face value might intuitively appear to be
the appropriate measure of price. However, most of the
premiums are returned to the policyholders as claims payments
Economists and industry analysts, thus,
or surrenders.
uniformly view the price of insurance as the "spread" between
the premium paid and the amount that the policyholder expects
to have returned on average in claims and surrenders. Almost
all empirical studies of insurance markets use the spread as the
appropriate price that equates supply and demand." Although
secondary market entry will likely drive life insurance
premiums higher, secondary market entry is unlikely to have a
material effect on the spread for life insurance. 49 Instead of
47. Christine Richard, With $70M Bond Deal, Wall St Manages To Securitize Death,
Dow JONES CAP. MARKETS REP., Apr. 30, 2004.
48. See David F. Babbel, The Price Elasticity of Demandfor Whole Life Insurance, 40
J. FIN. 225, 228 (1985).
49. Doherty & Singer, supra note 15, at 470-72 (providing a more thorough
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buying a less liquid and, hence, inferior product at a lower
premium, consumers are now buying a more liquid and, hence,
superior product at a corresponding higher premium.
Considering only the spread, however, ignores the effect of
the reduced riskiness of the product on insurance demand.
Enhanced liquidity brought about by the secondary market
makes life insurance a superior risk management product that
enables the policyholder to more effectively protect himself from
the financial effects of death or health impairment. Stated
differently, entry into the secondary market eliminates the
downside risk of receiving less than the market value for the
policy if the policyholder experiences a decline in health.
At any price spread, risk aversion will cause consumers to
demand more from a product whose payouts are less risky.
Thus, the demand curve will shift outward, as shown in Figure
2. The demand before entry is represented by the curve
"Demand 1," and the supply is denoted by the curve "Supply
1." The market price, or spread, is "Spread 1," and the quantity
is Q1, as shown by point C. The entry of viaticals and life
settlement firms will improve product quality and will increase
demand to "Demand 2." In the short run, entry will cause
excess demand and will increase the price to "Spread 2" with a
higher quantity, Q3, as shown by point G. In the long run, the
higher margin will attract new capital into the primary
insurance industry, thereby increasing supply to "Supply 2."
This higher margin will restore the spread to roughly its
previous level, "Spread 1," and the volume of insurance will
increase further to Q4, as shown by point H. Thus, the
cumulative effect of entry into the secondary market for life
insurance is a larger, but equally competitive, primary industry.

explanation of the spread on life insurance policies).
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FIGURE 2: CONSUMER WELFARE ANALYSIS
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The consumer benefit from entry into the secondary market
can be measured by comparing the "consumer surplus" before
and after entry occurs -that is, the area under the demand curve
bounded at the bottom by the spread. Before entry, the
consumer surplus is the triangle ABC. In the short run, entry
increases demand, thereby increasing consumer surplus to EFG.
Even at the temporary higher spreads, consumers are better off
with entry in the secondary market because the product is much
improved. In the long run, as the higher spreads induce
additional insurance capacity, the spread decreases and
consumer surplus rises even more to the triangle EBH. The
improvement in product quality, together with competitive
pricing, provides a clear benefit to consumers.
As explained above, entry by viatical and life settlement
One
firms should improve the welfare of policyholders.
measure of this improvement in welfare is the difference
between a policy's surrender value and the amount by which the
policyholder was compensated by a life settlement firm,
summed across all policyholders who exercised their option to
sell their policies in the secondary market. Table 1 estimates the
welfare gains earned by policyholders in 2002 from the exercise
of life settlement options.
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TABLE 1: ANNUAL CONSUMER WELFARE GAINS
FROM THE USE OF LIFE SETTLEMENTS (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Coventry First

Policies
Total Surrender
Value
Total Offer to

All Life Settlement
Firms
2002 Projected
Total
1,584
$93.4

Jan. - Aug.
2002
352
$20.8

2002 Projected
Total
528
$31.1

$79.1

$118.6

$336.3**

$58.3

$87.4

$242.9

Policyholders

Total Policyholder
Surplus

Note: This table is estimated by extrapolation from data provided by the
market leader in life settlements, Coventry First, to market estimates.
* Coventry First estimates that its transactions represent roughly one third
of total life settlements.
** This number represents a lower average offer for the industry relative to
Coventry First (3.6 times the surrender value as opposed to 3.8 times the
surrender value).
This adjustment was made for purposes of
conservatism, because the offers made by Coventry First tend to be a few
percentage points higher than those of its competitors. Source: Coventry
First internal customer data (on file with authors).
As Table 1 demonstrates, life settlement firms improved
policyholder welfare by over $240 million in 2002. This number
vastly understates the true positive effect of the secondary
market on policyholders, however, because it does not account
for the welfare gains generated by viatical firms. Second, our
estimate does not incorporate the welfare gains of policyholders
from the unexercised option to sell their policies in the future.
Unfortunately, this valuable option is difficult to measure.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this figure does not
capture the response of the incumbent insurers to the entry of
secondary market players. Following the entry of these players,
incumbents have introduced accelerated death benefits (i.e.
enhanced surrender values) for those demonstrating reduced life
expectancy. The magnitude of this response is such that the
numbers shown in Table 1 vastly underestimate the benefits to
consumers from the new secondary market.
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IV. KNOWLEDGE OF THE SECONDARY MARKET FOR LIFE
INSURANCE

The secondary market provides considerable benefits to life
insurance policyholders. The associated increase in consumer
welfare, however, is only a fraction of what it could be if
policyholders were better informed about the secondary market.
It is the role of life insurance agents and financial planners to
ensure that their clients possess the best possible information to
make decisions regarding their financial futures. It is, therefore,
incumbent upon such professionals to make policyholders
aware of the value of secondary market transactions where such
a transaction might potentially be helpful to their clients.50 Lack
of information about the secondary market for life insurance
prompts policyholders to make inefficient decisions regarding
their life insurance holdings. In this section we examine the
effects of such suboptimal decisions and explain some of the
barriers to greater consumer knowledge about the secondary
market.
A.

THE EFFECTS OF SUBOPTIMAL DECISION-MAKING

It is common for uninformed consumers in financial
markets to unknowingly subsidize savvy consumers. Because of
suboptimal decisions by policyholders in the purchase and
surrender of life insurance policies, the market prices of policies
are lower than if all purchase decisions were rational and
informed. This phenomenon is similar to the observation that
home mortgage rates are lower than they "should" be because of
the common failure of homeowners to refinance their mortgages
when it would be financially advantageous to do so.
In the market for life insurance, policies are presumably
50. At the same time, a life insurance agent or financial planner should ensure that her
clients do not engage in secondary market transactions based on incomplete knowledge, as
such transactions are not in a policyholders best interests where a policyholder does not have
a discernable reason to eliminate the policy.
51. The effect of such decisions in the market for life insurance is particularly strong
because of the high share of life insurance policies that are disposed of before maturity.
Milliman USA estimates that nearly 90% of universal life policies do not end with a death
claim. Letter from Timothy C. Pfeifer, F.S.A., Consulting Actuary & Principal, Milliman,
USA to Alan S. Lurty, Vice President, Coventry Financial, L.L.C. (Apr. 24, 2002)
[hereinafter Milliman Letter] (on file with authors).
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priced on the basis of some uneconomic lapse expectation. It is
always in the interest of insurance carriers, given an installed
base of policies, for consumers to learn as slowly as possible
about their assignability rights, just as in the mortgage market it
is in the interests of lenders for the percentage of consumers who
understand refinancing to grow as slowly as possible. Full
information about assignability rights and the benefits of the
secondary market would squeeze all of the incumbents'
remaining margins from secondary market surrenders. Life
insurance carriers, therefore, have an incentive to try to hide the
assignability feature from their policyholders and to discourage
their agents from keeping consumers well informed.
The lack of assignability, or the widespread lack of
consumer knowledge of assignability, would create two kinds of
inefficiencies. Although one of these inefficiencies would lead to
a lower initial premium in the primary market for life insurance,
both inefficiencies would lead to lower consumer welfare.
The first inefficiency involves the policyholder who would
be willing to sell his policy for its true economic value but
retains the policy because he is not willing to accept the set
surrender value offered by the incumbent carrier. Coventry
First, a leading life settlement firm, reports that, on average, the
surrender values for the policies it purchases represent only 4%
of the face value of those policies.52 So, for example, a policy
with a $500,000 face value might have a cash value of $20,000,
but an economic value of $80,000 if the consumer has a life
expectancy of six to twelve years. If the consumer would be
indifferent between retaining his policy or selling it for a price of
$45,000, then her inability to assign the policy would force her to
forgo a $35,000 surplus from the sale of the policy (equal to the
$80,000 she would receive for the policy in a competitive
secondary market less the $45,000 for which she would be
willing to sell it). Because the policyholder in this case would
hold her policy to maturity, the insurer is no better off than if the
policy had been sold to a third party. The first inefficiency from
the restriction of assignability, thus, generates a pure
deadweight loss, with no offsetting gain to insurance carriers
that could be used to subsidize premium rates.
The second inefficiency involves the policyholder who is so
52. This also means that borrowing against the policy, which can never exceed the face
value, is not a way to raise much money.
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in need of money that he will surrender the policy to the
incumbent carrier for $20,000 even if the economic value of the
policy is $80,000. In this case, the policyholder is made $60,000
worse off by his inability to assign the policy to a third party for
its economic value, but the insurer gains $60,000 from the
consumer's lack of knowledge about the secondary market.
The whole purpose of buying insurance is to pay money at
times when the consumer has less utility from extra money in
return for the receipt of money in times where the utility from
extra money is very high. A consumer would surrender a policy
for less than a third of its economic value only if his current need
for money was extremely high. Therefore, a system in which
policyholders lack knowledge of their secondary market options
takes money away from consumers in a state where they
potentially have a very high marginal utility of money to
subsidize them when they are making premium payments and,
presumably, have a low marginal utility of money. Such a
system unambiguously reduces consumers' expected welfare.
Lack of knowledge on the part of policyholders about the
secondary market for life insurance policies, therefore, creates
two major types of distortion, both of which reduce consumer
welfare. The first type costs the consumer money upon
liquidation without reducing premiums. The second type leads
to an equal reduction in premiums if the insurance market is
fully competitive but still leaves consumers worse off.
B. BARRIERS TO CONSUMER KNOWLEDGE OF THE SECONDARY
MARKET FOR LIFE INSURANCE

At least in the short term, carriers have resisted the entry of
viatical and life settlement firms by a variety of tactics.53
Establishing entry barriers is not surprising. Incumbent life
insurance carriers stand to lose money in the short term as a
result of the decreased likelihood of profitable lapses on policies
that were issued before the emergence of a competitive market
for life insurance policies. Additionally, carriers have earned a
substantial portion of their margins from surrenders by
policyholders with diminished life expectancies and likely
retained a portion of those margins as profits. To the extent that
incumbent carriers recognized profits, on net, from the pre53. See New Lease on Life, THE ECONOMIST, May 17, 2003, at 86.
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existing surrender system, the carriers' actions may be an
example of what economists describe as rent-seeking behavior.5
The carriers are attempting to prevent losses on previously
issued policies and may also be attempting to protect the profits
that they derived from their monopsony position in the
secondary market.
Incumbent insurance carriers have a clear economic motive
to eliminate viatical and life settlement firms from the secondary
market for life insurance policies.55 This motivation explains
why life insurance carriers have lobbied for regulations on
viatical and life settlements that are unfavorable to any
secondary market transactions.
There is evidence that
incumbent carriers have pressured their agents to shun the
secondary market for life insurance and prohibited agents from
dealing with viatical and life settlement firms. 56
The
incumbents' strategies can be best understood in light of their
economic interest in re-establishing monopsony positions in the
secondary market.
V. REGULATION OF THE SECONDARY MARKET FOR LIFE
INSURANCE

As of September 2002, viatical and life settlements were
governed by a patchwork of state and federal regulations. In
1996, the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) bid to
regulate viaticals under federal securities law was rejected by
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.57 But even though
they were not considered to be securities under federal law,
many states classified viatical settlements as securities and
54. See generally TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M.
Buchanan et al. eds., 1980).
55. See, e.g., Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Business World: Back to the Future When Life
Insurance Was Fun, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2001, at A23 (explaining that "by selectively
keeping in force only the industry's losing policies, investors can't help but screw up the
industry's returns").
56. Doherty & Singer, supra note 15. See New Lease on Life, THE ECONOMIST, May
17, 2003, at 86.
57. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Todd
Mason, Firm Barredfrom Selling Shares ofPolicies,FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Feb.
27, 2002) (In February 2002, however, the SEC won a preliminary injunction against a
brokerage firm for fraudulently selling fractional interests in life insurance policies. The
SEC was able to win this injunction, its first court victory since the Life Partners case,
because the firm had offered guaranteed repurchase terms, which classified the investment
as a security).
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regulated their sale to investors as such." As of September 2004,
thirty-seven states regulated viatical transactions through their
insurance regulatory departments, but only twenty-three of
these regulated life settlements. 59
The regulatory environment has allowed certain abuses by
unscrupulous companies. As we explained earlier, however,
those abuses have targeted individual investors almost
exclusively. The top firms in the life settlement and viatical
industries have been supportive of antifraud laws on the
grounds that such laws would help curtail abuses by
disreputable firms and inspire public confidence in (and
demand for) the services of the industry as a whole.
One example of self-regulation is the Life Settlement
Institute, which is a non-profit trade group consisting of six of
the major institutionally funded life settlement providers and
financiers. 60 In 2002, the Life Settlement Institute began building
an antifraud database for companies to share information of
suspicious or fraudulent activity by policy sellers, brokers,
doctors, financial advisors, or the insured themselves.6 1 In
addition to such self-regulation, the Life Settlement Institute
publicly advocates a stricter and improved regulatory
environment. The Institute strongly supports strict regulation
by state insurance and securities regulators of the viatical and
life settlement marketplace 62 and supports amending the Federal
Securities Act of 1933 (The Act) so that interests in pooled life
insurance policies sold to individual investors would constitute
"securities" under the Act."
In January 2001, Ohio enacted a law for the regulation of
viatical firms modeled after the NAIC's Model Viatical

58. Carol M. Ostrom, A Warning About Fraud in Death-Benefit Sales; $1.8 Million
Lost in State, Securities Chief Testifies, SEA1TLE TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at Bl.
59. See Stone Street Financial, Compliance: State by State Update (As of October

2004), available at http://www.stonestreetfinancial.com/compliance/compliance.asp
(providing detailed state-by-state information on viatical and life settlement regulation) (last
visited Oct. 28, 2004).
60. See Retirement Protectionsupra note 20, at 65.
61. Institute to Track Viatical, Life Settlement Fraud, BEST'S INS. NEWS, July 12,

2002.
62. See Retirement Protectionsupra note 20, at 68.

63. Id. at 66 (stating that "on the state level, [the Life Settlement Institute and its
members] urge the passage in every state of legislation patterned after the NAIC Model
Act").
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Settlement Act."6 The Ohio law extends the definition of viator
to include individuals who participate in life and senior
settlements, mandates disclosures of pertinent information
to policyholders, protects the identity of viators, and provides a
viator with an unconditional 15-day right to rescind on his or
her contract after receiving the proceeds of a settlement.65 The
law stipulates that viatical and life settlement providers
must present "an anti-fraud plan that describes how they will
prevent, identify, and report fraud" to obtain licensing with the
state. 66 Violators of the law are subject to criminal and
administrative penalties. 67
As of February 2002, only twenty states regulated the sale of
interests in viatical or life settlements to individual investors, but
there is movement in the right direction.68 Some states engage in
heavy regulation of the secondary market for life insurance. For
example, Kentucky mandates that a life insurance agent must
complete an approved forty-hour viatical "prelicensing
classroom course of study," apply for and obtain a separate
license from the state, and pay a fee of $250 dollars before he is
allowed to broker a life settlement with a client for whom such a
settlement might be the best option. 69 In such jurisdictions,
participation in viatical and life settlement transactions can be
almost prohibitively costly.
VI. CONCLUSION

Secondary markets for financial products provide liquidity and
thereby enhance the value of those products. The emergence of
viatical and life settlement firms and the growth of ADBs has
created a competitive secondary market for life insurance.
Participation in a viatical or life settlement does not make sense
for the majority of life insurance policyholders. There are a
variety of circumstances, however, in which a policyholder

64. News Release, Ohio Department of Insurance, Michael Fulwider, Director of
Communications, Robert Denhard, Communications Manager, Covington Backs New Law
Regulating Viatical Settlements (Jan. 12, 2001), at http://www.ohioinsurance.gov/
Newsroom/scripts/Release.asp?ReleaselD=784 (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
65. Id.
66. Id.

67. Id.
68. See Retirement Protection supra note 20, at 67.

69. Viatical Settlement Broker License, 806 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 9:310 (2003).
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could be made better off by his policy in the secondary market.
Most life insurance customers, however, lack detailed
knowledge about the particular products and features available
or are unable to accurately assess the value of such features. The
volume and complexity of information necessary to achieve
optimal life insurance holdings precludes consumers from acting
with full and complete information. 70 According to a June 2003
poll commissioned by the NAIC, only thirty-four percent of
insurance policyholders believed that they understood the
details of their insurance coverage "very well."71
Moreover, uninformed consumers and policyholders are
unlikely to understand the assignability features on their own.
Some consumers undoubtedly underestimate the risk of
developing a terminal illness and being unable to obtain the
actuarial value for a policy by selling it back to the issuing
insurance company. Indeed, many who find themselves in that
situation are unaware of the resale possibilities.
The role of the life insurance agent is to provide information
to consumers so that they can make informed choices in the
purchase of life insurance in the primary market. 72 Life
insurance carriers, themselves, emphasize the value of their
advisory services, delivered through agents, to consumers.7 3
Consistent with this role, life insurance agents should
understand the set of available secondary market offerings and
should advise those policyholders who intend to liquidate their

70. See, e.g., Michelle Singletary, The Trick to Insurance is Grasping the Details,

WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2003, at E3 (stating that it is easy for consumers to be overcome by
the complexity of life insurance and that the purchase of life insurance is "rocket science").
71. FLEISHMAN-HILLARD KNOWLEDGE SOLUTIONS, NAIC, PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE ON
INSURANCE 6 (June 2003).
72. INS. INST. OF IND., INDIANA INSURANCE FACTS 61 (2003-04) (stating that "one of

the first steps in obtaining life insurance coverage should be to contact a life insurance
agent" and urging consumers to know what a potential policy provides by "mak[ing] sure
the agent explains items you don't understand").
73. See Press Release, GenAmerica Financial Corporation Introduces American Vision
Term Product Portfolio (Feb. 21, 2001) (declaring that GenAmerica Financial's mission is
"to create exceptional financial outcomes for its clients through top-flight advice, products,
and services"), http://www.genamerica.com/pubsite/genamweb.nsf/index.htm (last visited
Oct. 28, 2004). The Principal Financial Group asserts that it will assist consumers in making
informed insurance purchase decisions "[t]hrough comprehensive needs analysis, we help
you to identify the most appropriate tax-saving strategies, estate-planning options, and
insurance protection plans needed to meet your long-term goals. From term life to
survivorship whole life, we work with you to help you select the insurance coverage that's
right for you and your family." Principal Financial Group, For Individuals, available at
http://www.principal.com/ind.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
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policies of the best products for their particular needs.
The secondary market for life insurance provides
policyholders with unambiguous benefits. Access to complete
and current information regarding their secondary market
options would allow policyholders to make optimal decisions
regarding their insurance coverage and enable the secondary
market to reach its full potential in terms of the welfare gains it
provides to consumers.

